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Free Exercise in Illinois: Does the State
Constitution Envision Constitutionally
Compelled Religious Exemptions?
Yes, let us with sorrow frankly acknowledge the fact

that liberty of conscience, in its grandest and truest sense,
even in this boasted land of freedom is frequently a sham
and a mockery, that liberty of conscience means that it is the
conscience of the majority which is free, to which that of
the minority must conform and succumb under severe
penalties. Let us adopt and forever abide by the motto of

Liberty for all, infringement upon the rights of none.'
-

William H. Snyder, Delegate,

1870 Illinois Constitutional Convention

Beginning with Sherbert v. Verner,2 a consensus emerged on the
Supreme Court that the Free Exercise Clause sometimes compelled exemp3
tions to general regulations for religious dissenters. Thereafter, until the4
decision in Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources v. Smith
was handed down, the Court strictly scrutinized First Amendment free
5
exercise claims by applying a compelling state interest test. This test
required that, where a governmental regulation substantially burdened a

sincere religious practice, the government had to justify the regulation by

1.

1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONvENTION OF THE

STATE OF IUI.NOIS OF 1869-70, 1562 (1870) [hereinafter DEBATES OF 1870].

2.

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

3. "What the Court is holding is that if the state chooses to condition unemployment
compensation on the applicant's availability for work, it is constitutionally compelled to carve

out an exception-and to provide benefits-for those whose unavailability is due to their
religious convictions." Id. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In 1878 the
Court rejected such a notion, claiming that exemptions based on religious conduct would allow
one "to become a law unto himself." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. E.g., Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S.
707, 717-19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
403. See Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)
(reiterating validity of compelling interest test in free exercise inquiries). The formula
articulated above is referred to herein variously as the compelling interest test, strict scrutiny or
the balancing test.
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demonstrating a compelling state interest that could not be achieved via less
6
restrictive means.
The Supreme Court abandoned strict scrutiny analysis for religious
objections to facially neutral, generally applicable laws with its five-to-four
decision in Smith,7 effectively rejecting constitutionally compelled religious
exemptions.' Justice Scalia's majority opinion stated that "the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' 9 Thus, the Court determined that a free exercise challenge to a
neutral, generally applicable law that incidentally burdens a particular

religious practice will not be subject to the compelling interest test.' °

6. James D. Gordon, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 92
(1991); Michael W. McConnell, The Originsand HistoricalUnderstandingof Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1416-17 (1990). But see Christopher L. Eisgruber and
Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom RestorationAct is Unconstitutional, 69 NYU
L. REV. 437 (1994). Eisgruber and Sager argue that "compelling interest" is a misnomer for the
test applied by the Supreme Court in free exercise claims. Referring to the compelling state
interest test they claim, "outside of Sherbert and Yoder, it had never really lived." Id. at 447.
7. Smith involved two Native American Church members who were fired from their
jobs at a drug rehabilitation organization for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug. Smith,
494 U.S. at 874. The two men used the drug for sacramental purposes in a church ceremony.
Id. The State of Oregon subsequently denied their applications for unemployment benefits,
citing a state law that precludes employees discharged for work related "misconduct" from
receiving such benefits. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause permits state
prohibition of sacramental peyote use, and therefore allows the state to deny unemployment
benefits to persons fired for such use. Id. at 890. Justice O'Connor concurred in the result of
Smith, but defended the use of a compelling interest test in free exercise challenges to generally
applicable laws. "Indeed, the Court holds that where the law is a generally applicable criminal
prohibition, our usual free exercise jurisprudence does not even apply. To reach this sweeping
result, however, the Court must not only give a strained reading of the First Amendment but
must also disregard our consistent application of free exercise doctrine to cases involving
generally applicable regulations that burden religious conduct." Id. at 892 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
8. While the Smith decision involved a generally applicable criminal law, lower courts
construed Smith as a rejection of free exercise protection for most cases. See, e.g., Montgomery
v. County of Clinton, 743 F.Supp. 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (legally required autopsy that
offended Jewish beliefs of deceased's family did not violate free exercise rights); Munn v.
Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991) (religious dissenter must comply with tort rule requiring
that plaintiff mitigate damages by accepting a blood transfusion); Cornerstone Bible Church v.
City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991) (zoning ordinance excluding churches from
downtown area does not offend Free Exercise Clause).
9. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
10. Id. at 884-85, n.3.
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Smith ignited a firestorm of controversy, sparking much debate over the
amount of free exercise protection provided by the First Amendment." The
unexpected decision had astounded Court watchers and infuriated much of the
country.' 2 Broad popular and political support prompted the United States
Congress to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 3
Recognizing that religious discrimination is often an unintended consequence
of generally applicable laws, 4 Congress restored the compelling interest test
for "all cases where free exercise of religion is burdened.... .""
Recently, the Supreme Court determined that Congress, in adopting the
pre-Smith test and applying it to state governments through RFRA, exceeded
the scope of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. 6 This decision
again subjects state laws to Smith's relaxed standards when such laws are
challenged under the First Amendment. Given the lower standard of federal
protection, many litigants, attorneys, scholars and organized church groups
can be expected to call upon individual states for increased protection of
religious freedoms. 7
Unfortunately, most states failed to independently analyze free exercise
claims under their individual constitutions in the post Sherbert years, 8 due in

11. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 6, at 96-7 (1991) (concluding that Smith displayed
poor reasoning, misused precedent and rendered the Free Exercise Clause almost completely
insignificant); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (criticizing the Smith opinion's theoretical argument and use of
constitutional text, history and precedent). But see, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of
Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309-10 (1991) (defending
Smith's rejection of a constitutionally compelled free exercise exemption from generally
applicable criminal laws but not the Smith opinion itself). These examples are but a minuscule
sampling of the debate over free exercise exemptions prompted by the Smith decision.
12. James M. Donovan, Restoring Free Exercise Protections by Limiting Them:
Preventing a Repeat of Smith, 17 N. ILL U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
13. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et. seq. (1993) [hereinafter
RFRA]. For a discussion of the broad support for RFRA see Thomas C. Berg, What Hath
Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious FreedomRestorationAct, 39 Viui
L. REV. 1, 12-17 (1994).
14. RFRA, § 2000bb(a)(2).
15. Id. at § 2000bb(b)(l). Eisgruber and Sager argue that RFRA's purported
"restoration" of the compelling interest test is an historically inaccurate portrayal of pre-Smith
free exercise jurisprudence. Eisgruber and Lawrence, supra note 6, at 445-52.
16. City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997). The Supreme Court ruled that
Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enacting RFRA, hence the
Act was unconstitutional as applied to the states. The Act still applies to the federal
government, as Congress has the power to legislate greater protection in the federal realm than
the U.S. Constitution provides.
17. See Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 854 (1992). See also infra note 22.
18. Angela C.-Carmella, State ConstitutionalProtection of Religious Exercise: An
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part to the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment. 9 In fact, many
states have intertwined federal and state constitutional analysis to such an
extent that it is not clear what standard these states would use to judge a state
constitutional free exercise claim.' Illinois is one such state.' This comment
advocates interpreting Illinois' free exercise provision apart from the First
Amendment and analyzes Illinois' own clause in an attempt to determine
whether or not it provides religious dissenters protection from generally
applicable state laws. Part I of this comment briefly delineates those reasons
why Illinois should consider and interpret its free exercise clause independent
of federal constitutional law. Part II embarks upon a textual analysis of
Illinois' Religious Freedom Section, while Part III surveys a few states with
comparable free exercise provisions. Part IV explores the history of Illinois'
free exercise provision. Part V analyzes the potential meaning of the section
and the possibility of incorporating the section into the State's religious
freedom jurisprudence. Finally, this comment concludes by asserting that the
Illinois Constitution's Religious Freedom Section compels religious
exemptions to some generally applicable state laws, and that the Illinois
Supreme Court should revive the section for use in its free exercise jurisprudence.22

Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U.L. REv. 275, 307 (1993).
19. Broad federal protection meant there was little need to invoke individual state

provisions. Furthermore, states may have been discouraged from independently analyzing their
constitutions because the Supremacy Clause would dictate that a broader federal free exercise
protection trump a more restrictive state protection.
20. Nicholas P. Miller & Nathan Sheers, Religious Free Exercise Under State
Constitutions,34 J. CHURCH &ST. 303, 306, 310-11 (1992).

21. Id. at 310; Michael P. Seng, Freedomof Speech. PressandAssembly, and Freedom
of Religion Under the Illinois Constitution,21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 91, 108-110 (1989); Thomas
B. McAffee, The Illinois Bill of Rights andOurIndependent Legal Tradition: A Critique of the
Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. IlL U. LJ. 1, n.186 and accompanying text (1987). See infra
Part IV.B.
22. AUTHOR'S NOTE: Some time after this comment was originally completed, an
Illinois version of the coalition that promoted RFRA at the national level formed in order to
advocate passage of the State's own Religious Freedom Restoration Act. At the Capitol, ST. J.

REG. IL, February 26, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 5556591. In but a few short weeks the bill
was considered, and both houses of the Illinois Legislature passed it with nearly unanimous

votes. Steve KloehnIllinois' Wide Religious Spectrum Comes Together, CHIC. TRIB., April 3,

1998, available in 1998 WL 2841999 (providing a brief history of the bill's genesis).
Eventually, Governor Jim Edgar used his amendatory veto powers to alter the bill, excluding
from its coverage the actions of state and local prison officials. Steve Kloehn, EdgarAmends
Law on Religious Freedom, CHIC. TRIB., August 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2885980.
Edgar feared that the law might burden law officials' efforts to maintain prison safety. Id. State
legislators disagreed with Governor Edgar's position and overrode his veto, making the new law
applicable to prisoners as well as the general populace. Dave McKinney, EdgarFoiled on
Religious Bill Veto, CHI. SUN-TMES, December 3, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 5609826.

1998]

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS

I.

WHY INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS?

The First Amendment reads in part, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
..... " The Illinois Religious Freedom Section reads:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed, and no person shall be denied any civil or political
right, privilege or capacity, on account of his religious opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not
be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse
acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of the State. No person shall be required
to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against
his consent, nor shall any preference be given by law to any
religious denomination or mode of worship.24
Achieving independent analysis for Illinois Bill of Rights sections has not
always been easy. Illinois earned a reputation in years past for shunning
independent judicial analysis,25 largely due to its voracious use of a "lockstep"
doctrine for state constitutional decisions.26 Pursuant to this doctrine, Illinois'
highest court adhered to Supreme Court precedent when interpreting Illinois
provisions (or issues) comparable to those contained in (or decided under) the
U.S. Constitution."
Some commentators have lamented the "lockstep"
Illinois' Religious Freedom Restoration Act restores "the compelling interest test as
set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder and Sherbert v. Verner," and guarantees "that a test of
compelling governmental interest will be imposed on all State and local (including home rule

unit) laws, ordinances, policies, procedures, practices, and governmental actions in all cases in
which the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 775 ILCS 35/10(b)(1) (citations

omitted).

While the constitutional issue discussed in this comment becomes less pressing in the

face of Illinois' Religious Freedom Restoration Act, it is no less important. The battle over
Illinois' bill demonstrates the potential fickleness of rights that are bestowed upon citizens by
political bodies. Construing Illinois' Constitution in the manner espoused herein will lend a
measure of constitutional certainty to the religious freedom enjoyed by Illinois' citizenry.
23. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
24. ILi CONST. art. I, § 3.
25. Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and
Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 270-72

(1994).
26. See generally McAffee, supra note 21.
27. See, e.g., People v. Diguida, 604 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1992); People v. Tisler, 469
N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984); People v. Jackson, 176 N.E.2d 803 (I11.
1961).
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approach to state constitutional jurisprudence,' while others have denounced

those states which have broken from Supreme Court precedent, claiming that

such state courts are often "reactionary" and their decisions unprincipled.29
Illinois' lockstep doctrine usually surfaced in criminal cases. Conse-

quently, it has never been expressly applied in a freedom of religion or speech
context." Nevertheless, excluding some very recent Illinois court decisions,
the State's Bill of Rights jurisprudence as a whole can best be described as
stagnant. 3' Illinois' religion decisions have hopelessly intertwined federal and
state constitutional analysis, with state and federal constitutional provisions
being treated as coextensive.32 An exhaustive treatment of either the lockstep
doctrine or Illinois' perceived constitutional stagnation are beyond the scope
of this paper. Instead, recognizing that the Land of Lincoln's judicial
conservatism in the area of individual rights has been easing somewhat as of
late,33 this article simply presents compelling justifications for the independent

28. E.g., McAffee, supra note 21; Justice Hans A. Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980).
29. E.g., Ronald Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions- Away From a Reactionary
Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson,
Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 975 (1979).
30. McAffee, supra note 21, at n.186.
31. See Schlam, supra note 25, at n.2 and accompanying text. In recent years, however,
Illinois has seemed much more willing to expand the scope of individual rights and liberties.
See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604 (Ill. 1996) (holding that the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340
(1987), violates Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution); People v. Washington, 665
N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996) (holding that, while a free-standing claim of innocence based on newly
discovered evidence is not cognizable as a federal constitutional due process claim, it is
cognizable as a matter of due process under the State Constitution); People v. McCauley, 645
N.E.2d 923 (111. 1994) (interpreting Article I, Section 10 to provide a much broader privilege
against self-incrimination than does the nearly identical Fifth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution). "It is the nature of the Federal System that we, as the justices of the Illinois
Supreme Court, are sovereign in our own sphere; in construing the State Constitution we must
answer our own consciences and rely upon our own wisdom and insights." Id. at 936 (quoting
People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d 410, 415 (Simon, J., specially concurring)); People v.
Bennett, 669 N.E.2d 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (considering Illinois Constitution first in deciding
that a defendant excluded from individual voir dire sessions involving potential jurors is denied
both state and federal constitutional rights). But see, e.g., McCauley, 645 N.E.2d at 941-46
(Bilandic, C.J., and Miller, Heiple, J.J., concurring and dissenting in part in separate opinions)
(recognizing that state courts have the power to interpret their constitutions independent of
federal law, but claiming that Article I, Section 10 of the Illinois Constitution should be read
as embodying only those protections afforded by federal case law interpreting the Federal
Constitution's Fifth Amendment).
32. As professor McAffee points out, one need only read the Smith-Hurd annotations
to the Illinois Constitution's religion provisions to see that this is the case. McAffee, supra
note 21, at n.186. See infra Part IV.B.
33. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of Illinois' free exercise provision, and argues that even under
a conservative judicial methodology the clause should be analyzed separate
from its federal counterpart.
State courts are free to construe their individual state constitutions in a
way that affords more protection for individual liberties than the federal
constitution provides.34 This fact has led scholars as well as prominent
judicial figures to champion the role of state constitutions in protecting human

freedom.35 Of course, state constitutions may also provide less protection than

the federal constitution.36 Justifiable criticism has been heaped upon state
courts which have expanded individual rights in the state context beyond those
afforded by the federal scheme through unprincipled decision-making.37 Some
courts have expanded rights by way of reactionary decisions solely because
they were at odds with the Supreme Court ideologically.3" To encourage a
principled approach in state constitutional decision making, courts should
simply ask what the state's guarantee means rather than ask whether such
guarantee is more broad or narrow than the Supreme Court's interpretation of
its federal counterpart.39

Primacy arguments aside,' there are a myriad of factors which argue for

judicial independence in determining what free exercise of religion means in

34. E.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
35. E.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Stanley Mosk, The Power of State Constitutions in
Protecting IndividualRights, 8 N. ILL U. L. REV. 651 (1988).
36. Hans A.Linde, Does the "New Federalism" Have a Future?, 4 EMERGING Iss. IN
ST. CONST. L. 251, 259 (1991); In Smith v. Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled that denial of unemployment benefits to
someone fired for ingesting peyote in a church service did not violate state constitutional free
exercise provisions, but did offend the Federal Constitution's Free Exercise Clause. 721 P.2d
445, 448-9 (Or. 1986). This ruling eventually led to, and was reversed by, the U.S. Supreme
Court's Smith decision.
37. See supra note 29.
38. See Robin B. Johansen, The New Federalism: Toward a PrincipledInterpretation
of the State Constitution, 29 STANFORD L. REV. 297, nn.7, 14 and accompanying text (1977).
39. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV.
165, 179 (1984).
40. In the federal system, state constitutions logically "come before" the federal
constitution, i.e., the Bill of Rights was derived from early state constitutions. See id. at 174.
In fact, Bill of Rights guarantees have only recently (relatively speaking) become applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. States regularly apply state law before reaching
federal questions when dealing with state constitutional passages that have no federal
counterpart and state statutes. Id. at 176. Primacy proponents contend that a court is always
responsible for its state's law and should address such law before deciding federal standards.
Id. at 178. Such an approach arguably provides the benefit of insulating a state's law from the
instability of ever-changing Supreme Court jurisprudence.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

Illinois. The Washington State Supreme Court cited some of these reasons in
First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle,4' a decision which
independently construed Washington's free exercise provision.42 First, the
court pointed to the uncertainty of Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence

as a reason for pushing beyond First Amendment analysis and considering the
state constitution.43 Next, the court listed six nonexclusive factors which
could be used to justify independent state constitutional grounds for a
decision: "1. The textual language of the state constitution; 2. Significant
differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state

constitutions; 3. State constitutional and common-law history; 4. Preexisting

bodies of state law, including statutory law; 5. Differences in structure
between the federal and the state constitutions; and 6. Matters of particular
state interest or local concern. '44
Because a lockstep approach has not been enunciated in Illinois freedom
of religion cases,45 the high court arguably has free reign to construe Article
I, Section 3 exclusive of federal law. 46 Furthermore, Illinois has parted way
with Supreme Court precedent even in the criminal context, 47 prompting one
justice to remark, "The only clear line of authority remaining which favors a
lockstep construction involves search and seizure. 48

Two widely quoted opinions seem to embody the majority's requirements

for independent interpretation. In People v. Tisler,49 Justice Ryan stated, "We
must find in the language of our constitution, or in the debates and the

committee reports of the constitutional convention, something which will

41. 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) [hereinafter First Covenant II].
42. Id. at 185-88.
43. See id. at 185. The court directly cited its lack of confidence in the Smith decision.
It found that Smith created uncertainty because it justified departing from a long history of
established law by relying on an overturned decision, whose reasoning Washington had earlier
rejected. Id. at 186. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44. 840 P.2d 174 at 186 (citing State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (1986)). Many of these
criteria support independent constitutional grounds for free exercise decisions in the state of
Illinois as well. See infra notes 58-68 and accompanying text. See also infra Part II.
45. McAffee, supra note 21, at 41.
46. But see Schlam, supra note 25. One argument cutting against free reign forjudicial
independence is the theory that Illinois' factional political culture has purposely instituted
constitutional inflexibility by making it extremely difficult to revise or amend the State
Constitution. This popular attitude toward constitutional changemakes judicial conservatism
an appropriate accommodation of the people's sovereign will.
47. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873 (Ill. 1988); People v. Duncan, 530 N.E.2d 423 (Ill.
1988); People v. Gacho, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (II1. 1988); People v. Smith, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (Ill.
1982) (possibly providing greater protection for the right against self-incrimination).
48. 533 N.E.2d at 881 (Clark, J., concurring).
49. 469 N.E.2d 147 (111. 1984).
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indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed
differently than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which
they are patterned."5 ° If the difference is in constitutional language, such
discrepancy must be "one of substance and not merely of form."'" While
extrinsic evidence does indicate that the Illinois free exercise clause should be
independently analyzed, 52 the vast difference in form between the Illinois and
the federal clause alone should be enough to warrant a presumption of
substantive difference, thereby spurning independent analysis to determine
whether such hypothesis is true.
Most importantly, Illinois' free exercise guarantee is not even remotely
patterned after the Free Exercise Clause. Article 1, Section 3 of the 1970
Constitution adopted wholly the language of the 1870 Constitution,53 which
had as its precursors the Constitutions of 1818 and 1848, which were preceded
by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. s' When constructing the 1818
Constitution, Illinois looked to other state constitutions as models.". The Bill
of Rights in particular largely copied the wording of parallel provisions in
Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee and Indiana. 6 Had Illinois framers desired to
mirror the Federal Constitution's guarantees, incorporating similar language
would have been easy enough. 7
The example of Article VIII, Section 3 of the 1870 Constitution, which
forbade the expenditure of public monies on sectarian ventures," illustrates
the possible importance of a convention having failed to adopt language
similar to that of the federal constitution. Before adopting the provision, the
delegates rejected a proposal to utilize language patterned'after the First
Amendment.59 The same Justice Ryan who was quoted above found that this
rejection of First Amendment language indicates "that the framers of the
constitution of 1870 did not intend that this section have the same meaning as
the first amendment but that it be more restrictive insofar as public aid to

50.
51.
52.
53.

54.

55.

56.
57.

Id. at 157 (emphases added).
Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 875.
See infra Parts II, III, notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
ILL CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. II, § 3.
EMIL JOSEPH VERUE, ILLJNOIS CONSTITUTIONS xvii-xxviii (1919).
Id.; R.C. BULEY, THE OLD NORTHwEST: PIONEER PERIOD 1815-1840 88 (1951).
JANET CORNEUUS, CONSTITTIMON MAKING INIUINOIS, 1818-1970 16 (1972).
Alaska (art. 1, § 4), Hawaii (art. I, § 4), Louisiana (art. I, § 8), Montana (art. II, §

5) and South Carolina (art. I, § 2) have free exercise provisions that mirror the First
Amendment.
58. This provision prohibited the expenditure of public funds "for any sectarian
purpose." IL. CONST. of 1870 art. VIII, § 3. This provision was adopted as Article X, Section

3 of the 1970 Constitution.
59. DEBATES OF 1870, supra note 1, at 15 or 62.
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sectarian schools is concerned."' The 1970 Constitutional Convention Bill
of Rights Committee voted unanimously to adopt Section 3 unchanged from
the 1870 provision, dismissing two proposals calling for the use of First
Amendment language.' Convention delegates later defeated a proposed
amendment that would have eliminated Section 3 as it stands and cloned the
First Amendment62 by a resounding seventy-to-sixteen vote.6 3 The fact that
the language used is entirely different from the Federal Constitution, and the
reality that First Amendment language was considered and rejected, make a
persuasive argument that Illinois' free exercise guarantee was never intended
as a redundancy of the Federal Free Exercise Clause.
Also poignant are observations made by persons involved directly or
tangentially in the formulation of the 1970 document. Leonard Foster, a Bill
of Rights Committee delegate, speaking to the question of whether Section 3
was coextensive with the Free Exercise Clause stated, "It was our feeling that
they were closely parallel, but not necessarily exactly the same."" Additionally, George Braden and Rubin Cohn, who analyzed the 1870 Constitution for
the Illinois Constitution Study Commission, postulated that the free exercise
guarantee likely did not go "beyond the more general First Amendment's
proscription on government power."' It is important to keep in mind the
historical context in which Braden and Cohn promulgated their report and
Foster made his "closely parallel" assessment.' When Braden and Cohn
surmised that Section 3 probably did not place greater restraints upon
governmental interference with free exercise than the First Amendment, they
did so at a time when the Warren Court had advanced historically broad
protections for individual liberties 7 and the compelling interest test had been
used in free exercise challenges.68

60.
61.

RIGHTS 83

62.

Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737, 750 (Ill. 1973) (Ryan, J., concurring).
ELMER GERTZ, FOR THE FIRST HouRs OFTOMORRoW: THE NEW ILLINoIs BILL OF

(1972).
6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OFTHE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTTrIONAL

3646 (1972) (verbatim transcripts) [hereinafter RECORD OF 1970].
63. Id.
64. 3 RECORD OF 1970, supra note 62, at 1372.

CONVENTION

65. GEORGE BRADEN AND RuBIN COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTrrUION: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 16 (1969).

66. Speaking about Article I, Section 3, Leonard Foster also theorized that, "if anything,
this provision is somewhat more restrictive than the one in the federal constitution." 3 RECORD
OF 1970, supra note 62, at 1372.
67. See Seng, supra note 21, at 103.
68. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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I1. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
A.

FREE EXERCISE

The "free exercise" clause69 of Section 3 is potentially the most limiting
part of the religious freedom provision. On its face, the guarantee for
religious worship might be read as protecting only religious rituals.70 For
example, a minor child drinking wine for sacramental purposes would qualify
as an act of worship and should receive an exemption from the general law

prohibiting consumption of alcohol by minors. But under this restrictive
definition of "worship" a person who declines a blood transfusion on religious
grounds or a kosher slaughterhouse that does not conform to uniform meat
preparation regulations would not be protected. On the other hand, if the term
worship is understood to mean a showing of reverence or devotion to a deity,
rather than only a demonstrative ritual, these latter actions would likely be
sheltered by Illinois' religious freedom guarantee. Historically speaking, the
more expansive interpretation of "worship" is probably justified. Early state
constitutions with similar provisions were framed by Protestant America, a
population that was anti-ritualistic and did not distinguish worship from the

general duties and obligations owed to their God.' Further, it seems that
under early state constitutions limiting free exercise to acts of worship, no
courts found, nor was it argued in free exercise cases, that the conduct in
question was unprotected because it did not qualify as worship. 2

69.

"The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
" ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
70. See McConnell, supra note 6, at 1460-61.
71. Id. at 1460.
72. Id. at 1461. In 1910 the Illinois Supreme Court defined worship:
'Worship' is defined by Webster as follows: '4. The act of paying divine

discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed ....

honors to the Supreme Being; religious reverence and homage; adoration
paid to God or a being viewed as God. *** The worship of God is an
eminent part of religion, and prayer is a chief part of religious worship.'
Worcester's definition is: '3. Adoration; a religious act of reverence;
honor paid to the Supreme Being or by heathen nations to their deities.
Worship consists in the performance of all those external acts and the
observance of all those rites and ceremonies in which men engage with
the professed and sole view of honoring God.'
Ring v. Board of Educ., 92 N.E. 251, 252 (Ill. 1910). The court's focus in this opinion is Bible
reading, praying and hymnal singing. Id. However, freedom of religion protection has been
extended to non-ceremonial conduct. See infra Part IV.B.
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B. "ON ACCOUNT OF" CLAUSE

"[N]o person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or
capacity, on account of his religious opinions."73 A plausible argument can
be made that the "on account of" clause allows no protection for religious
conduct, but merely shields believers from governmental discrimination on the
basis of their personally held religious opinions. Further, a facially neutral
law that burdens religious conduct does not impinge upon that activity
4
because of, or "on account of," its religious character. 7
However, such construction would add nothing to the preceding "free
exercise" clause if that clause is taken in its broader, more realistic sense.
Furthermore, the language would be virtually meaningless because, as
Professor James Gordon observes, even totalitarian governments cannot stop
people from believing whatever they want. 7 ' The assertion that facially
neutral laws do not burden religious conduct on account of the conduct's
sectarian nature is countered by the opposite argument: one who clashes with
a neutral law due to religious conviction is penalized on account of religious
opinion if the conflict would have been avoided but for the person's religious
76

belief.

C. PEACE AND SAFETY PROVISO

Perhaps the strongest case for a constitutionally compelled religious
exemption is presented by Section 3's "peace and safety" proviso 77 which
reads, "but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to
dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State."78 Hence, religious
conduct that is unsafe, licentious in nature, or not peaceable is subject to state
regulation. Stated inversely in its strongest terms, government can only
restrict religious conduct of the type delineated by the clause.79 If this is true,
the clause dispenses with any need for balancing state and individual interests
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.

Iu.. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
Miller and Sheers, supra note 20, at 316.
Gordon, supra note 6, at n.10 and accompanying text.

Miller and Sheers, supra note 20, at 316.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REUGIOUS LIBERTY

(1986) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT]
(stating that "in a majority of the states that ratified the Bill of Rights, 'free exercise' meant that
UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 9

the government had no right to interfere with religious activities until those activities threatened

public peace and safety or infringed the rights of others").
78.
ILL CONST. art. I, § 3.
79. See JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 77, at 30, 88-104 (asserting that at

the time the First Amendment was ratified a majority of states had adopted this formulation).
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where the state interest falls outside the proviso's specific scope. 0 Balancing
opposing interests is necessary when the conduct falls within the proviso's
scope.8'
Another nearly parallel interpretation of the "peace and safety" clause
requires the balancing type test embodied in Sherbert for all free exercise
challenges.82 Courts adopting this construction implicitly agree with Professor
McConnell who asserts that such provisos only make sense if they contemplate religious exemptions from some generally applicable laws.83 Because
laws may not specifically target religion, and because otherwise legal
activities cannot be prohibited (whether deemed unsafe or not), the clause
only has effect if religious activities violate some general law. 4 Laws
precluding breaches of the peace, unsafe acts or licentious conduct are specific
categories of general laws, and free exercise excuses religious activity up to
and until the point that such conduct violates these limited categories. 5
However, rather than limiting state regulation to only those categories of law
enumerated, the clause simply requires a balancing of individual and state
interests.86
III.

STATES WITH SIMILAR FREE EXERCISE PROVISIONS

Many states with free exercise provisions comparable to Illinois' Section
3 have either neglected to address these constitutional passages entirely or
have failed to interpret them independently of their federal counterpart.87 A
handful of states have, however, determined that their free exercise provisions
provide greater religious liberty than the First Amendment currently affords.8"
A.

WASHINGTON

The Washington State Constitution contains an "on account of" clause as well
as a "peace and safety" proviso. 9 In First Covenant Church v. City of
80. This is because conduct outside the proviso is absolutely protected. See discussions
infra Parts III.C, III.D.
81. See infra Parts III.C, III.D.
82. First Covenant I,840 P.2d at 187.
83. McConnell, supra note 6, at 1462.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See infra Parts III.A, III.B for a discussion of two states using this formulation.
87. Miller and Sheers, supra note 20, at 306, 310-11.
88. Those states having free exercise provisions identical to the First Amendment that
have interpreted their constitutions in such a manner are not dealt with because of the
dissimilarity to Illinois' Article I, Section 3.
89.

WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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Seattle,"'the Washington Supreme Court interpreted the State's free exercise
clause as requiring the employment of a compelling state interest test.91 In its
opinion, the court relied upon the provision's "plain meaning"' and prior case
law. While the precedents cited by the court support strict scrutinization of
free exercise claims, those opinions rely on federal free exercise cases and do
not indicate that use of the test is born from the state constitution. Nevertheless, the court decided that a Seattle ordinance which designated a church as
a historic landmark impermissibly burdened First Covenant's free exercise of
religion because the resulting administrative and financial burdens were not
justified by a sufficiently important governmental reason. 93
B.

MAINE

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine applied the compelling interest test
pursuant to Article I, Section 3 of the State's constitution in Rupert v. City of
Portland.9' The Maine Constitution displays versions of the "on account of"
clause and the "peace and safety" proviso.9" In Rupert, a Native American
Church member sought to force Portland to return a marijuana pipe that police
had seized as drug paraphernalia.9 6 The plaintiff used the pipe for religious
worship and thus sought a religious exemption from Maine's Drug Paraphernalia Act. 97 The court mirrored Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Smith,
finding that the statute withstood strict scrutiny because of the State's
overriding concern in preventing illegal drug use and because the means used
were the least restrictive available to the government. 9 After deciding that the
state constitution provided no relief, the court considered the First Amendment challenge, finding that the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith
afforded no protection for the plaintiff.99

90.

840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).

91.

Id. at 187.

96.
97.

Rupert, 605 A.2d at 64.
Id.

92. See id.
at 186.
93. Id.at 188.
94. 605 A.2d 63, 65-67 (Me. 1992). Despite relying on the state constitution for
application of the compelling state interest test, the court in a footnote professed that there was
no reason to decide if the State would follow the Supreme Court's lead in Smith when applying
the Maine Free Exercise Clause. Id. at n.3.
95. ME. CONST. art. I, § 3.
98. Id.at 67.
99. /dU
at 67-68. The court explained that the act in question was a generally applicable
law that did not target religion, and therefore Smith did not permit a First Amendment religious
exemption. Id.
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Subsequently, in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,'
Maine's highest court seemingly affirmed use of the compelling interest test
in free exercise claims. In declining to impose a common law duty of
supervision of employees (clergy) on a church, the court reasoned that to do
so would "restrict its freedom to interact with its clergy in the manner deemed
proper by ecclesiastical authorities and would not serve a societal interest
0
sufficient to overcome the religious freedoms inhibited."' '
C.

MASSACHUSEITS

The Massachusetts Constitution exhibits variations of the "on account
of' and "peace and safety" clauses, 2 as well as a provision paralleling the
Federal Free Exercise Clause. 03 In Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston
Landmarks Commision, " Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court held that
designation of the Jesuit's church interior as a landmark violated Massachusetts' free exercise provision."0 5 The court relied solely on Article 2 of the
state constitution in its decision, and reasoned that "[t]he configuration of the
church interior is so freighted with religious meaning that it must be
6
considered part and parcel of the Jesuit's religious worship.""' The opinion
goes on to proclaim that because renovation of the church interior constitutes
religious worship, and does not disturb the public peace nor obstruct the
religious worship of others, such renovation is categorically protected by
Article 2."°7 The court seemingly contradicts itself when it subsequently
applies a balancing test, concluding that the government's interest in historic
preservation is not sufficiently compelling to warrant interference with the
free exercise of religion.'
Chief Justice Liacos' concurring opinion in Attorney General v.
° makes clear the tests Massachusetts uses for free exercise
Desilets""
°
challenges. If the religious conduct in question is covered by Article 2," that
conduct is absolutely protected unless it falls within the peace and safety

100. 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997).
101. Id. at 445.
102. MASS. CONsT. part 1, art. 2.
103. MASS. CONST. amend. XLVI, § 1.
104. 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
105. Id. at 572-3.
106. Id. at 573.
107. Id. at 574.
108. Id.
109. 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
110. Whether the court should have found the defendant's conduct within the scope of
Article 2 in Desilets is the main subject of Chief Justice Liacos' concurrence.
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proviso."' In other words, a religious exemption is compelled by the
Massachusetts Constitution unless the conduct disturbs the public peace or
interferes with another's worship. If the conduct comes within the proviso the
compelling interest test is applied.2
D.

MINNESOTA

Another state that limits those governmental interests that may outweigh
religious freedom is Minnesota. The Minnesota free exercise provision
contains the peace and safety proviso.13 The State's Supreme Court has
proclaimed that "[o]nly the government's interest in peace or safety or against
acts of licentiousness will excuse an imposition on religious freedom under
the Minnesota Constitution."" 4 In State v. Hershberger,the court found that
an Amish challenge to a statute requiring slow moving vehicles to display
bright orange triangles when traveling public highways concerned the public
safety." 5 However, like Massachusetts, rather than automatically deny a
religious exemption Minnesota requires that the competing interests be
balanced." 6 In Hershberger this resulted in a religious exemption for the
Amish when the court made a factual determination that the State could
achieve its safety goal by using less restrictive means."'7
IV.
A.

ILLINOIS HISTORY

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Legislative history for the freedom of religion provision is sparse, and
extant material is inconclusive with regard to the drafters' intent. The chief

I 11.
112.

Id. at 243 (Liacos, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 246 (Liacos, C.J., concurring) (citing Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 536
N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1989)). All of the justices in Desilets agreed that a case analyzed under
Article 46, Section 1 required application of the compelling state interest test. Id. at 236; Id. at
243 (Liacos, C.J., concurring); Id. at 246 (O'Connor, J., Nolan and Lynch, J.J., dissenting).
113.

114.
115.

MINN. CONST. art. l, § 16.

State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990).
See id at 398-99. The Amish challengers believed that the bright orange color was

a "worldly symbol" and display of such symbol would violate their religious beliefs - namely

that Amish members must remain apart from the modem world. State v. Hershberger, 444
N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989), cert. granted and judgment vacated, Minnesota v. Hershberger,
495 U.S. 901 (1990).
116. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 398; Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray
High School, 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992).
117. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 399. The Amish proposed use of reflective tape and
lighted red lanterns, an alternative the court deemed reasonable. Id.
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is that it was meant
discovery revealed by exploration of Section 3's history
8
counterpart."
federal
its
to be, and is, distinct from
The Illinois country's first free exercise guarantee was embodied in the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and stated simply, "No person, demeaning
himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account
19
of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territories.",
When Illinois progressed to statehood, its free exercise provision was set forth
in the Constitution of 1818,2 and later duplicated in the Constitution of
1848."2 The Constitution of 1870 adopted the language that makes up the
present day guarantee. 22
The recorded debates of the 1870 Constitutional Convention hint that
some members read the adopted provision as allowing the government to
interfere with religious freedom only when licentiousness or the peace and
safety of the State were at stake. In fact, some of the debate centered around
the "peace and safety" proviso itself. Delegate Silas L. Bryan declared,
"[H]ere we define clearly what is to be held a violation of lawful religious
toleration. The section declares that licentiousness, and that alone, is the
counterpart of religious toleration." 1 3 Delegate Washburn opposed the
inclusion of the proviso, and in speaking of religious liberty claimed "[iut has
existed in the Constitution of our State, without an 'if,' without a 'but,'
without any condition whatever, for more than fifty years.'' "I say, sir, I am
not willing to see the people of the State of Illinois go back half a century.
12 5
Mr.
They have stood on the principle of perfect religious freedom ....
Washburn then made a telling and dire prognostication. "[Tihere is great
danger in the proviso being abused, because the State, always in the majority,
can very easily abuse it. The State, bringing to its aid this proviso, will always
be able to construe the proviso to the destruction of the principal 'declaration.'"126

118.
119.

See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
NORTHWEsTORDINANCEOf 1787 art. I.

123.

2 DEBATES OF 1870, supra note 1, at 1565.

120. '"hat all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can of right be compelled to
attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent;
that no human authority can in any case whatever control or interfere with the rights of
conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments
or modes of worship." ILL CONST. of 1818 art. VIII, § 3; see also art. VIII, § 4.
121. ILL CONST. of 1848 art. XIII, § 3; see also art. XIII, § 4.
122. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. II, § 3.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1562 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1563.
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We can be certain that some of the members viewed licentiousness
broadly, thought any violation of law jeopardized the State, and welcomed Mr.
Washburn's prediction that the free exercise grant might be construed very
narrowly. However, even some of the delegates who supported the inclusion
of the peace and safety proviso seemed to intimate that religious exemptions
to some laws would be appropriate. In supporting the proviso, Delegate
Benjamin offered the example of child sacrifice as inconsistent with the peace
and safety of the state." 7 Walking the streets naked pursuant to one's
beliefs," infanticide and burning wives on a funeral pyre were all proffered
as examples of licentious acts or conduct that endangered the peace and safety
of the State. 9 Such extreme examples perhaps lend credence to the notion
that members saw lesser violations of law as appropriate candidates for
religious exemption. Delegate Underwood may or may not have agreed,
observing that "[l]icentiousness is legitimately and properly a subject of
human legislation. Hence this explanation, that religious liberty shall not be
interpreted, as often is, to allow licentiousness or crime."' 130 When queried as
to whether or not the section would allow the Mormons to practice polygamy,
no affirmative or negative answer was given, and Delegate Allen would only
venture, "I do not know anything about that."''3
Yet another debate pertaining to religious exemptions centered on a
proposal to amend the constitution by granting an exemption to religious
objectors from answering civil process on the day they recognized as their
Sabbath. 3 2 The petition, after meeting with initial success, was eventually
rejected on the ground that it was unnecessary. 33 A majority of members felt
the petition was based on a misconception of the petitioners rights under the
law, as they were already entitled to exemption, or that the petitioners should
pursue legislative protection." Delegate Church opposed the petition, feeling
it redundant and therefore unnecessary. "It seems to me that it is clearly
within the power, not only of the Legislature to provide for any class of
persons who may have scruples in regard to any particular day of the week,
but also that it would be the duty of every judge, of every person exercising

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
Saturday.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 1560.
Id. at 1565.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1560.
This petition was apparently put forward by citizens who observed the Sabbath on
Id. at 1777.
Id.
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any power in any departmentof the government, to relieve any personfrom
any duty which would be imposed by law, on his Sabbath. "'35
While the comments of the 1870 framers are often ambiguous with
regard to the exact meaning of the religious freedom section, it is at least clear
that many of them believed that heretofore the free exercise of religion had
been an absolute right and that the new passage allowed the government to
interfere with free exercise only in limited circumstances. Of course, some of
the delegates surely believed that licentiousness or violations of public peace
and safety ran the gamut of illegal behavior.
The 1970 floor debates and committee reports shed no light on the
question of religious exemptions. Most of the material addressing religion is
aimed at the prohibitions on establishment of religion, with secular aid for
sectarian affiliated schools taking center stage. The most telling comment
comes from an exasperated Mrs. Kinney who decries, "There were vague
references in the presentation by the Bill of Rights Commission that the
Illinois provision was somehow more restrictive in a vague and nebulous way.
It was never further explained, and I do not really understand how or why or
in what manner, because that was never developed."' a6 It seems that the Bill
of Rights Committee itself never sorted out how the Illinois provision might
be more restrictive than its federal counterpart, except in relation to the
establishment portions of each section. In any event, the "somewhat more
restrictive" comment was made at a time when the U.S. Supreme.Court had
advanced broad protection for the free exercise of religion.' 37
B.

CASE LAW

Few Illinois court decisions squarely address the question of religious
exemptions to generally applicable laws, and fewer still make a concerted
effort to interpret Article I, Section 3. Contemporary decisions either fail to
address the State constitution entirely or analyze religious cases in federal
terms, treating the federal and state provisions as coextensive.13 However,
some idea of Illinois' religion jurisprudence can be garnered from a survey of
cases involving various religious questions.

135. Id. at 1776 (emphasis added).
136. RECORD OF 1970, supra note 1, at 3643.
137. See supra notes 67, 68 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 21; see also Metzl v. Leininger, 850 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. ll.1994).
"The protections provided under this provision of the Illinois Constitution [art. I, § 3] are
generally considered to be coextensive with those offered under the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution." Id. at n.3 (citing In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1024 (11.
App. Ct. 1990)).
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In Hroneck v. People,'39 the Illinois Supreme Court decided that Section
3 of the 1870 Constitution forbade the use of religious tests to determine
whether or not a citizen could testify in court."4 The court cited an earlier
case in its opinion, remarking that "[t]he only exception to uncontrolled
liberty is that acts of licentiousness shall not be excused, and practices
4
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state shall not be justified."'1 '
Ring v. Boardof Educucation42 declared, long before the federal courts,
that bible reading and praying in the public schools were unconstitutional.'4 3
Compulsory worship was invalidated under Illinois' free exercise clause,'"
and bible reading was deemed sectarian instruction and therefore violative of
Illinois' establishment clauses because public schools are supported by
government taxation.145
In McCollum v. Board of Education,"46 a scheme that allowed an
association of various faiths to offer religious education classes to pupils
during school hours was called into question. Illinois' Supreme Court
distinguished the case from Ring, finding that the classes were not compulsory
and did not constitute worship services, and that neither the instructors nor the
materials used were paid for by the school district. 47 The court held that the
voluntary program of religious education was constitutional, relying on the
earlier case of Latimer v. Board of Education.4 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed, ruling that the program violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.149
In Bernat v. Bicel; ° the State Supreme Court ruled that a statute
authorizing court officers to unilaterally introduce religious representatives
into divorce proceedings for the purpose of advancing a reconciliation denied
religious freedom guaranteed by the Illinois' free exercise section and the First

139. 24 N.E. 861 (Ill.
1890).
140. Id. at 864-65.
141. Id. at 864 (quoting Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509 (1871)).
142. 92 N.E. 251 (Ill.
1910).
143. Id. at 251-52.
144. ILd.The court found the school children were "deprived of the freedom of religious
worship guaranteed to them by the Constitution" under Article II, Section 3 (currently art. I,§
3) and that the "free enjoyment of religious worship includes freedom not to worship." Id.
145. Ik.
at 252-57. The establishment clauses consisted of both Article VII1, Section 3
and Article II, Section 3.
146. 71 N.E.2d 161 (I11.
1947), rev'd 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
147. Id. at 164, 166.
148. 68 N.E.2d 305 (1111946).
149. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
150. 91 N.E.2d 588 (Ill.
1950).
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Amendment.'' In making its decision, the court failed to distinguish one
constitutional provision from the other." 2
In Wallace v. Labrenz' 3 Illinois' high court validated a law that
interfered with the religious practices of parents who would not consent to a
blood transfusion for their minor child on religious grounds. The court held
that the State interest in promoting the child's welfare outweighed the burden
placed upon the parents' religious freedom."s While the court cited the State
and Federal Constitutions, it relied exclusively upon federal case law in its
analysis.'
Thirteen years later the court held that authorization given an
appointed conservator for an adult woman to consent to blood transfusions
against her wishes denied the woman religious freedom." The court relied
solely on the First Amendment and determined that the State could not satisfy
the compelling interest test. In 1989 the court determined that a minor who
objected to a blood transfusion on religious grounds had a right to do so
because she possessed the requisite maturity."' The court, however, decided
that the minor had a common law right to decline medical treatment and
expressly avoided addressing the constitutional issue.'
In Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Village ofMorton, ° a church
appealed the village's denial of its parochial school's request to expand to an
unlimited enrollment.' 6' The school was located inside the church which was
situated within a residentially zoned neighborhood. 62 The appellate court
denied the church's request for unlimited enrollment authorization, relying
completely on the First Amendment and federal cases. 63 Despite the denial
of the appeal the court employed a balancing test, ultimately deciding that the
village's interest in maintaining the sanctity of the surrounding neighborhood
outweighed the burden placed upon the church's free exercise rights.' The
court did, however, hold that a special use permit allowing an enrollment cap

151.
152.
153.

Id. at 595-97.
Id.
104 N.E.2d 769 (I11.1952).

155.

Id.

154.

156.
157.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id. at 773-74.

In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (IlL. 1965).
See id. at 438-443.

In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (1111989).
Id. at 328.
559 N.E.2d 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id. at 536-39.
Id. at 538.
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of one-hundred-five students was compelled by the church's free exercise
65
rights.
After the U.S. Supreme Court's Smith decision, and before the enactment
of RFRA, an Illinois court ruled that a person who fails to mitigate damages
by refusing medical treatment on religious grounds must bear the proportionate share of tort liability for the damage proximately caused by the refusal of
medical treatment."6 The court relied on the Supreme Court's Smith decision
to deny a medical patient harmed by his physician's negligence a religious
exemption from the common law rule that a patient must reasonably mitigate
damages in tort.167
Recent decisions by Illinois appellate courts have affirmed the notion that
the judiciary may not resolve disputes that involve an inquiry into, or a
determination or interpretation of a church's religious policies, practices,
doctrines or tenets. 68 These decisions have mentioned the Illinois free
exercise provision but have relied upon federal cases to determine that judicial
intervention into such matters deny churches their constitutional right to freely
169
exercise their religions.

V. RAISING THE DEAD
The stage has been set and the time has come for an independent analysis
of Illinois' free exercise provision. The recent pullback by the United States
Supreme Court in the area of free exercise protection espoused by the Smith
decision and the overthrow of RFRA means that plaintiffs will have to seek
protection for their religious freedom from their respective states. Illinois can
easily fill the void left by the retreat in federal law, as many factors cry out for
judicial independence in the matter of Article I, Section 3. Illinois' Religious
Freedom Section was adopted as a guarantee unto itself, not at all dependent
upon the current state of First Amendment jurisprudence. The Illinois
Supreme Court, increasingly willing to throw off the shackles of a misguided
"lockstep" mentality, should recognize Article I, Section 3 for what it is-a
rich source of protection for the individual increasingly burdened by invasive
government.
The free exercise provision should be given its plain meaning. Religious
freedom is absolutely guaranteed, save for conduct that jeopardizes the peace
165.
166.

167.
168.

See id. at 539.
See Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).

Id.
E.g., Bivin v. Wright. 656 N.E.2d 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Gabriel v. Immanuel

Evangelical Lutheran Church, 640 N.E.2d 681 (I1. App. Ct. 1994).

169.

Id.
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and safety of the State. 70 Not only does the plain language suggest such a
guarantee, but history may lend its support as well. 17 ' As the Supreme Court
observed in In re Brooks, more than one hundred years ago the State of
Virginia had adopted a bill "for establishing religious freedom" which
proclaimed that "it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts
against peace and good order."'' 7 What is more, the Illinois Supreme Court
as early as 1871 declared, "The only exception to uncontrolled [religious]
liberty is that acts of licentiousness shall not be excused, and practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state shall not be justified.' 7 3
Certainly our modern day court would be hard pressed to characterize a
landlord's refusal to rent to unmarried couples on religious grounds and
similarly placid conduct as breaches of the peace or unsafe activities.
At a minimum, Illinois' highest tribunal should affirm those decisions
that call for application of a compelling interest test to free exercise challenges. Such a move would hardly be breaking new ground. Rather, such a
ruling would merely affirm prior cases that were accepted as having furthered
worthwhile public policy goals. Furthermore, such a move by Illinois'
Supreme Court would not be novel, as some of Illinois' sister states with
similar provisions have already made such a leap. Granted, some precedent
hostile toward religious liberty will have to be dealt with, but the majority of
case law may be read as supportive of at least some religious exemptions to
generally applicable state laws.
CONCLUSION

The pieces are almost in place and are simply waiting for the Illinois
Supreme Court to assemble them. There is a real need to assert the State's
constitutional protections so that religious minorities are not subject to the
whims of an often oblivious majority. 75 Illinois' free exercise provision is an
exclusive source of constitutional law, and one whose plain meaning makes
it very valuable in a time of shrinking federal protection.
GLEN V. SALYER
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See supra notes 77-81, 107, 111, 114 and accompanying text.
See generally McConnell, supra note 6.
Brooks, 205 N.E.2d at 439 (citing 12 Hen. Stat. 84).
Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509 (1871).
See supra Part Ill.
See AUTHOR'S NOTE, supra note 22 (Ed.).
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